Abstract-Large amount of (security) faults existing in software systems could be complex and hard to identify during the fault analysis. So, it is not always possible to fully mitigate the internal or external security faults (vulnerabilities or threats) within the system. On the other hand, existence of faults in the system may eventually lead to a security failure. To avoid security failure of the target system we need to make it flexible and tolerant in the presence of security faults. This paper introduces a goal-based modeling approach to develop security requirements of securitycritical systems (SCSs) by explicitly factoring the faults into the requirement engineering process. Our approach establishes a model for security requirements (SRM) with respect to the formally described model of security faults (SFM). We care for fault tolerance in SRM by taking into consideration partial satisfaction of security goals. The proposed approach factors this partiality into the goals by applying proper mitigation techniques during the refinement process. This eventually contributes to a fault tolerant model for security requirements of the target system.
INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important concerns of software development. However, today's software development techniques do not pay enough attention to engineering of security into the system analysis and design [1] . Although there have been some efforts to incorporate the security analysis into the requirements engineering phase, it's not specified yet how to achieve this automatically during the requirements engineering process [2] . On the other hand, not all of the security faults existing in software systems are identifiable during the fault analysis [3] . Due to the unavailability of complete fault prevention we have to remove security faults. Fault removal also may introduce new fault(s) into the system. Hence, exhaustive fault analysis is not always possible and elicited security requirements may not mitigate all of the possible security faults [4] .
In this paper we present a goal-oriented approach toward modeling, specification and analysis of security requirements and security faults for fault tolerant SCSs. The method contributes to a fault tolerant model for security requirements of the SCS. Our aim is to help security analyzers make the target system tolerable in the presence of security faults by explicitly factoring the faults into the development process. For this purpose, we support partial satisfaction of security goals with respect to the unavoidable security faults. Hence we apply and customize the temporal fuzzy requirement engineering language of RELAX [5] incorporated into the KAOS syntax for goal modeling [6] , this also makes our generated models amenable to analysis and refinement at the requirement engineering time. Furthermore we apply formal mitigation techniques to mitigate the security faults and finally make a fault tolerant SRM for the given system specification. This paper, therefore, has three main contributions. Firstly, it gives a process for elicitation and formal description of security requirements and faults. Secondly, it presents a novel application of RELAX to incorporate the fault tolerance into the requirement model of the system through partial satisfaction [7] of security goals and explicitly factoring the security faults into the requirement and fault model of SCS's [6] . Finally the paper introduces the interrelation between SRM and SFM to address mitigation of security faults. We illustrate our approach by applying it to a typical online banking system (OBS), a security-critical system providing some banking services like money transfer. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related works. Section III presents our modeling approach and introduces OBS as our running example. Section IV describes the details of applying the approach to the OBS system. Finally, in Section V, we present conclusions and discuss future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
Today most of the existing practical security engineering techniques rely on attack trees. Attack trees are widely used to model how the attacks can be performed and what impact they might have on the systems. The work [8] uses attack trees for threat and risk analysis. But it doesn't specify how to mitigate the threats. Kenneth S. Edge in [9] uses protection trees to mitigate the threats. But this work doesn't address partial satisfaction of security goals.
In [10] , the author has proposed a method for elaborating security requirements by construction of anti-models. The work has proposed techniques for resolving goal satisfaction difficulties to address malicious faults violating the security goals. This is performed through formal description of security goals and anti-goals in terms of first order logic expressions. Although the proposed technique contributes to precise description of security requirements but it does not explicitly factor the security faults into the requirements. This technique consequently is not able to address partial satisfaction of security goals to tolerate the violations. The author has resolved this problem in [11] by addressing partial goal satisfaction through propagation of partial degrees of satisfaction within the goal refinement process. Since the technique uses probability to care for partiality, it only specifies the system secureness probability while we need to know how much secure the software is and how we can incorporate the security concerns into the system design during the future stages. In other words, probabilistic logic does not capture partial goal satisfaction for addressing faults in security requirements. It doesn't specify how to factor this partiality into the security requirements. In the probability logic, the goal is either satisfied or not while in the fuzzy logic, the goal may be "roughly" satisfied [6] . Hence fuzzy logic addresses the problem by explaining how much a security goal is satisfied. Another important work is [4] in which the author systematizes some new concepts and design principles in field of fault tolerance in security critical systems. The paper describes the basic concepts of intrusion tolerance (IT) and the relation between classical fault tolerance and security.
To incorporate the security considerations into the development stages, SQUARE is introduced in [2] by Carnegie Mellon University to specify a step by step methodology for eliciting, categorizing, and prioritizing security requirements. Although this work addresses the tractability issues by indicating what to do within each step but it doesn't specify how to perform the operations within the steps and how to describe the security requirements.
The works [5] and [6] , represent the RELAX language, a textual language for dealing with uncertainty in dynamically adaptive systems requirements which allows requirements to be temporarily relaxed if necessary to support adaptation. The work [7] also has applied RELAX to address partial goal satisfaction for dynamically adaptive systems. It gives a constructive process to elicit the adaption requirements by explicitly factoring the uncertainty factors into the process. Our work is mostly inspired by this paper.
III. MODELING APPROACH

A. Running Example
To demonstrate the validity of our approach, we conducted a case study provided in [9] describing an online banking system (OBS) as a SCS. We present an excerpt of the document here to serve as a running example for introducing our approach. The OBS relies on security concepts to work properly. Hence 1) maintaining integrity, 2) achieving a high level of confidentiality and 3) maintaining OBS available to the users, as the key features of security [3] are extremely important. 
OBS provides some regular banking services like money
B. Methodology
Our approach includes several steps. For a given system specification, firstly we specify the system's security goals with respect to the business goals. Subsequently, we specify the requirements needed to satisfy security goals. Concurrent with the second step, we specify the possible security faults. Note that both requirements and faults would be modeled and formally described with respect to the existing system requirement artifacts like attack trees or use case and misuse case [12] diagrams. Afterwards we develop both SRM and SFM through the mitigation process to mitigate (tolerate) the security faults. After risk analysis we try to refine the models. The refinement process may likely lead to the modification of requirements. This may continue again and again until the SRM is called to mitigate (tolerate) the SFM.
C. Development of Artifacts
Before starting the requirement elicitation process, we create a conceptual domain model in terms of UML use casemisuse case diagrams which identifies the key scenarios of the system and the relations among them. These scenarios reveal some security faults which must be mitigated (tolerated). Fig. 1 gives the conceptual domain model, identifying the use case and misuse case scenarios and their relationships. The use cases providing security functionalities are introduced as security use cases. Actor might be a good actor or attacker (insider) [12] .
D. Model Description
We describe both SRM and SFM formally using customized combination of KAOS and RELAX. The fuzzy temporal logic formal semantic of our selected syntax makes mathematical analyses and model checking possible in the future stages. Requirements and faults in SRM and SFM are represented in terms of RELAX statements so each requirement or fault entity has its attribute values describing it. These attributes are introduced in TABLE I. In the initial model of SRM, the goals are supposed to be completely satisfied. Since it is not always possible to completely satisfy the goals, sometimes we need to accept the partial goal satisfaction [11] . We address this partiality in terms of the relaxed attributes in RELAX statements. Consequently, we benefit from fuzzy temporal logic as a semantic for our applied syntax to take the security faults into account during the RE process [2] . This way we can incorporate the fault tolerance into the target system's SRM.
E. Factoring Security Faults
Every requirement entity in SRM has a 'relaxed' attribute whose value takes security faults like vulnerabilities or threats into account. This way, we accept the presence of security faults and plan to tolerate them in case the removal or prevention is not feasible. We build such a fault tolerance into the SRM through partial satisfaction of security goals as a mitigation technique. In the following sections we give an example for partial goal satisfaction to care for security faults and facilitate the fault tolerance in the OBS.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH FOR THE OBS
In this section we demonstrate how our approach can be applied to a typical SCS resulting on a fault tolerant SCS. For this purpose we represent the results of applying our proposed approach to the OBS. We give examples of all of the threat mitigation techniques we have applied to mitigate (tolerate) the security faults within the target SCS.
A. Step 1: Identify Assets and Security Goals
Step 1 is to identify the OBS assets and top-level security goals to protect the OBS against possible attacks (i.e., Protect [OBS] ). In this step we initiate the SRM with refinement of the top-level goal to protect the system assets. Given in the scenario, OBS's assets include bank accounts, private information of bank such as its security mechanisms, private information of the users like their financial transactions and personal information. As a service provider, OBS services also should be reliable and available to users. From identified assets we can specify the systems security goals in the highest-level of the SRM to protect the assets. The initial SRM is represented in terms of nodes R1 to R4 in Fig. 3 . The inverse of a 'Protect' goal is an 'Attack' goal. Hence the highest-level goal in SFM should be Attack [OBS] . We achieve the initial SFM of OBS by simply inverting the SRM. It is also represented in terms of nodes F1 to F4 in Fig. 2 .
B. Step2: Develop Fault Model
In this step we develop the initial SFM in regard to the system's security artifacts. Security artifacts include all kinds of artifacts which are used to identify security faults and threats in the target system. These artifacts include attack scenarios, misuse cases and attack trees. They are supposed to be developed by security experts within the early stages of development [2] . So we assume they are ready to use in this step. The security expert develops the SFM based on both security artifacts and his own experience. In other words, the security expert tries to find out any possible misuse scenario that might threat the security goals and eventually system assets identified in the previous step. Note that the more accurate the SFM is, the more accurate the SRM would be.
C. Step3: Ground Mitigation
In this step we develop the next generation of SRM to mitigate the threats represented in SFM. Both SRM and SFM are computational graphs. Hence the process starts with inverting the SFM developed in step 2 resulting in the next generation of SRM. For example we have the requirement node R1.1.1 in SRM to mitigate the fault goal F1.1.1 in SFM which means the OBS shall generally avoid hijack server. In the following steps we develop the SRM by refining the related sub goals mitigating the security threats in the SFM. The refinement process will be continued till the SRM sufficiently mitigates the SFM. This means responsibility of the satisfaction of every leaf on the goal's satisfaction path is assigned to a single agent.
D. Step4(i): Mitigation-No refinement
We neglect the mitigation of security fault if it doesn't threaten the system assets.
E. Step4(ii): Mitigation-Add low level sub goals
Is to add sub goals If the security fault can be mitigated by adding new low-level goals. The security fault F1.1.1.2, which is represented by the 'achieve outside attack' in Fig. 2 , has been mitigated by adding a new goal achieve [Harden Network] specified by the arrow 4(ii) in Fig. 3 . In other words, we can reduce the likelihood of outside attack, by making it harder for attacker to penetrate the network system from outside the OBS. In a similar way, we have added a sub goal R1.1.2.3.1 (achieve [Implement Challenge Response]) to make it harder for attacker to threat the transfer network. Challenge response is a security mechanism which tries to identify the user by exchanging some security information between system and user. This mitigation is also highlighted by the arrow 4(ii) in Fig 3. 
F. Step4(iii): Mitigation-RELAX goal
If partial satisfaction of the security goal is acceptable, we RELAX the goal. We apply this technique when threats can be partially mitigated. In this case, we add flexibility by explicitly factoring the security faults into the SRM. As discussed before, this contributes to a fault tolerant model for the target system which can resist in the presence of unavoidable security faults. For example, generating random IDs and implementing password policy in OBS can help to avoid ID and password to guess but don't guarantee the attacker cannot guess the ID or password. As a consequence, the goal R1.1.3.2 in Fig. 3 cannot be guaranteed to be satisfiable under all circumstances. To avoid security failure of the OBS, the threat should be tolerated in the requirement model. We address this through RELAXation. Fig. 3 shows the result of RELAX-ation of requirement R1.1.3.2. We have RELAXed it by assigning the RELAX statement of 'as many as possible' to the 'relaxed' attribute of the requirement R1.1.3.2 (as it's depicted by the arrow 4(iii)). So, the full description of R1.1.3.2 would be as below:
.2: OBS shall generally avoid [ID and Password to Guess] as close as possible to hardToGuess"
The value 'hardToGuess' is a constant value representing the optimum value for difficulty of guessing password and ID. Note that the mentioned value is the optimum value not definitely the maximum value; this means the difficulty of guessing ID and password might be less than the maximum value while it's still optimal and consequently if the difficulty becomes greater than optimal it becomes far from optimal. This is explained in terms of fuzzy nature of RELAX semantic:
"AG ((Δ (avoid ID and Password to Guess) -hardToGuess) ∈ S)"
Where S is a fuzzy set whose membership function has value 1 at zero (m (0) = 1) and decreases continuously around zero. "Δ (avoid ID and Password to Guess)" represents the hardness of guessing the ID and password which will be compared to 'hardToGuess'. It means although we cannot accurately measure the difficulty of guessing the ID and password for OBS, the system model should use the capabilities of security resources for providing a best effort at protecting ID and password from attacker. On the other hand to care for cost efficiency, better resource allocation and usability of the target system, the difficulty of guessing ID and password should not exceed the 'hardToGuess'. How to achieve acceptable level of difficulty is left to the OBS's designer to determine. The system designer in the subsequent stages then is aware of partial satisfaction of R1.1.3.2. Hence he can apply proper design strategies to care for this partiality to make the target OBS, tolerant in the presence of security threats.
G. Step4(iv): Mitigation-Add High Level Goal
Consider the situation in which the ID and Password are guessed by the attacker and the OBS cannot tolerate this security violence. In this case, we have to add redundant behavior in terms of high level security goal(s) to tolerate the threat. As it's depicted in Fig. 4 , we may add supplementary authentication mechanisms like biometric and challengeresponse as high-level security goals to avoid unauthorized access to accounts in case of violation of R1.1.3.2. However, this new goals represent new behavior and the closer to the toplevel goal they are, the greater the cost of implementation would be [7] . The new goal is OR-ed with the other high level goals. As it is shown, the definition of high or low is comparative. Better Saied, We call a goal as a high-level goal when adding it to the system's SRM will cause radical changes in the specification of the original security requirement model. The large amount of security faults existing in software systems could be complex and hard to identify during the fault analysis. Consequently, not all of the security requirements might be elicited to mitigate the security faults [4] . In addition, the existing security engineering techniques are mostly based on attack tree concept. But application of attack trees is not enough by itself because it doesn't reveal how to mitigate (tolerate) the attacks. In this paper we have presented a step by step approach toward modeling and specification of security requirements and security faults for fault tolerant security critical systems. The method is a goal-based approach for elicitation of security requirements and construction of security requirement model and security fault model. Our approach employs RELAX to explicitly factor the security faults into the security requirements and address partial satisfaction of the security goals which eventually leads to a fault tolerant model for security requirements of the system. We have illustrated our approach including the process for creating the requirement model by applying it to a typical online banking system (OBS) as our running example.
There are several ways to expand this work. Efficient pruning of security and fault models relies on performing a proper risk analysis in the earlier stages of requirement elicitation process. So, we need to incorporate appropriate attributes like cost of goal satisfaction and probability of attack into the SRM and SFM respectively to help the security analyzers categorize and prioritize the security requirements and faults. Developing a measurement model to evaluate the degree of fault tolerance in requirement model of the system is also another way to continue the work.
